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LAW, CULTURE, AND FAMILY: THE TRANSFORMATIVE
POWER OF CULTURE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW
NANCY E. DOWD*
Law inevitably is involved in the resolution of cultural conflicts.
Nonintervention acts as powerfully as intervention; in either case, law
is a powerful actor in its role as a part of cultural dialogue, as well as
in its role as a coercive force.,
Law is never neutral in my view. If it "stays out" of a situation,
then it is complicit in the status quo or in permitting the conflict to be
resolved without legal intervention, which may weight the outcome in
a particular direction.2 If law "comes in," it similarly "sides" with a
particular position because, in part, our adversarial, either/or, di-
chotomous orientation tends toward a winner and a loser, rather than
a win-win situation.,
* Chesterfield Smith Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I am
grateful for the research assistance of Michael St. Jacques and the comments and inspiration of
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse and Berta Hernandez-Truyol.
1. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983);
Kenneth B. Nunn, Illegal Aliens: Extraterrestrials and White Fear, 48 FLA. L. REV. 397, 400-01
(1996) [hereinafter Nunn, Illegal Aliens]; Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth
and Symbol in the Adversarial Criminal Process-A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender
and a Proposal for Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 755-56 (1995) [hereinafter Nunn, The
Trial as Text]. One recent example of this is the case of a Nigerian woman, Amin Lawal, who
was sentenced to be stoned to death for the crime of having a child out of wedlock. The
argument for nonintervention is a respect for culture as well as sovereignty; the argument for
intervention in the name of human rights norms and gender norms is an argument for law as
well as an argument for culture. See Court Upholds Stoning for Nigerian Mother, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2002, at A10. More recently, it appears that the president of Nigeria will intervene, if
the courts do not, in carrying out this sentence. See President Says Stoning Won't Happen, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2002, at AS.
2. For example, the intent requirement and state action requirements limit constitutional
intervention in the area of racial equality. See Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
Similarly, constitutional protection is denied for children despite the triggering of child abuse
structures. Cf DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
3. For examples, consider abortion (see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883
(1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)) and medical decision-making (see Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (removal of feeding tube); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C.
App. 1990) (en banc); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (cases involving
decisions of pregnant women regarding medical treatment or refusal of treatment that would
harm their fetuses or themselves)).
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In the area of family law, law is consciously not neutral and heav-
ily value-laden.4 If we believe that law represents and enforces moral
consensus and cultural norms (the Devlin model discussed by Post),5
then clearly family law is an area where moral judgments are the
stated premise of many aspects of the law. At the same time, because
privacy is such a core moral value of family law, private ordering and
resolution gives the illusion of law remaining outside of familial
conflict or cultural conflict about families, leaving conflict to legal
resolution only when necessary.6 But as Fran Olson argued long ago,
and many domestic violence scholars have similarly noted, noninter-
vention is not neutral in the context of family hierarchies and so-
cial/cultural norms that impact the freedom and equality of family
members.7 This is not to say that family law has not attempted to
adhere to positions of neutrality. For example, family law arguably is
wedded to the principles of gender neutrality and gender equality,
and therefore, its application should not reflect a gendered pattern.'
Nevertheless, both women and men claim bias, operating simultane-
ously but in different ways, in the family law system.9
If the law's role inevitably is to contribute to a resolution of con-
flicts, then I would suggest two starting points. First, we should be
4. Marriage and illegitimacy are two examples of this characteristic of family law.
Marriage statutes reflect a moral consensus linked to religious traditions, and the strong support
of marriage through the extensive array of benefits for married couples states a clear preference
for a certain structure of family and adult partnership. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 883-84 (Vt.
1999) (cataloguing the state and federal benefits of marriage in the context of a challenge to
Vermont marriage statute by same-sex couples). Recent efforts to strengthen marriage as
expressed in the adoption of covenant marriage statutes in several states similarly reflect a
moral stance or value determination about marriage, especially as a lifelong relationship. See
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal Implications,
59 LA. L. REV. 63, 107 (1998). Illegitimacy is an example of a not neutral, moral stance in
family law regarding the categorization and stigmatization of nonmarital children. Although
illegitimate children have gained some constitutional protection, the status is still permitted and,
even with constitutional protection, some discrimination is permissible. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971);
see generally Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 93, 103-47.
5. See Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 485-86 (2003).
6. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
7. LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988); ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST
LAWMAKING (2000); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Preroga-
tive and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
8. NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES 60-62 (1997); MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
DIVORCE REFORM (1991).
9. NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 58-65 (2000); FINEMAN, supra note 8.
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particularly concerned about the ability of law to stigmatize, subordi-
nate, and constrain. Both law and culture are expressions of power,
at least to the extent that culture is the expression of consensus or
dominant cultural norms.10 It is important to ask whether law, in the
resolution of cultural conflict, is acting to subordinate or liberate. I
will call this the antisubordination principle." Translated into a
methodology, this suggests that we ask where the power lies in
cultural conflicts and in the expression and application of legal rules.
We also should "ask the other question": when we evaluate the
intersection of law and culture, we should look for traditional pat-
terns of inequality, even when it may not seem obvious to do so. 12
Second, in addition to the antisubordination principle, we should
recognize the limitations of law as a means to accomplish social
change in the absence of cultural support. I will call this the limited
instrumentalism principle. Mere legal rules, without affirmative and
meaningful support, can be undermined by power, culture, or both.13
10. See Nunn, The Trial as Text, supra note 1, at 760; see also Nunn, Illegal Aliens, supra
note 1, at 398-400.
11. I mean to borrow here from feminist and critical race theories. I therefore focus on
subordination as the means to analyze the role of private and public actors and also to explore
the intended and unintended consequences of legal structures and institutions. See, e.g.,
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 44 (1987); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); MARI MATSUDA ET AL.,
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1993); Patricia Hill Collins, The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought,
reprinted in REFLECTIONS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY (James A.
Montmarquet & William H. Hardy eds., 2000); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
12. This is a methodology identified by Mar Matsuda. Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister,
Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991):
The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms of subordination is
through a method I call "ask the other question." When I see something that looks
racist, I ask, "Where is the patriarchy in this?" When I see something that looks sexist,
I ask, "Where is the heterosexism in this?" When I see something that looks homo-
phobic, I ask, "Where are the class interests in this?" Working in coalition forces us to
look for both the obvious and non-obvious relationships of domination, helping us to
realize that no form of subordination ever stands alone.
See also Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2380-81 (1989) ("The emerging jurisprudence of outsiders uses the
experience of subordination to offer a phenomenology of race and law .... If law is where
racism is, then law is where we must confront it.").
13. The limits of law as an agent of social change is not a new concept. See FINEMAN,
supra note 8. Another recent example of this is the pattern of usage of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, which is disproportionately taken by female caretakers, despite the gender neutral
entitlement. Mary Anne Case, Commentary: How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling
Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753 (2001); Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395 (1999).
2003]
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When we look at the relationship between culture and law with
family as the axis for analysis, the analysis exposes the power of
cultural norms of family. If you look at law and culture through the
axis of family, the cultural construction of family is so strong that
culture can change law, but law cannot change culture. Changing,
evolving conceptions of family can subvert and eventually transform
law. But law cannot force change in the culture of family. Law may
facilitate change, but cannot make it happen. While law can force
individual outcomes contrary to the lived experience of family, law
cannot reorient family norms in conflict with culture.
This interaction between culture, law, and family is apparent in
the work of Professors Bentley 14 and Gordon.15 Their papers illus-
trate the complex interaction of cultural constructions of family,
particularly of marriage and intimacy, with law. They do so by
focusing on relationships deemed at the margin by the dominant
culture in the nineteenth century: interracial marriages and plural
marriages. Their insightful analyses point the way for excavating
meaning from current cultural conflicts and the role of law. In
particular, their analyses point in the direction of current marginal-
ized groups in family law: single-parent families; gay and lesbian
partners and parents; step relations and blended families; nonbiologi-
cal parent-child ties; nurturing fathers; economically marginalized
mothers; nonmarital families; and immigrant families. Their work
also reminds us that when we "ask the other questions," hierarchies
of race, religion, class, sexual orientation, and gender may be re-
vealed. Those revelations would suggest that we look for those
hierarchies in our modern cultural conflicts.
In order to more fully explore the insights raised by these two
papers, I consider here a current example of the interplay between
culture and law around the axis of family. The tragedy of September
11, 2001, operated on a multitude of levels, and continues to unfold in
law and culture in many ways. What I want to explore, in a prelimi-
nary way, is the impact on law and culture of the sudden focus on a
cross section of families that suffered the loss of family members on
that day. The family stories collected and told in the pages of the
New York Times in its unique Portraits of Grief were the initial
14. See Nancy Bentley, Legal Feeling: The Place of Intimacy in Interracial Marriage Law, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773 (2003).
15. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, The War of Words: Revelation and Storytelling in the
Nineteenth-Century Campaign against Mormon Polygamy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 739 (2003).
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inspiration for my analysis.16 The complex web of individual lives
caught in those unusual biographies and the transformative potential
of these life histories was a profound revelation amidst our grief at
lives cut short. It was striking how those portraits exposed connec-
tions of care and intimacy that defy traditional family norms. They
revealed the fluid, creative, functional way that family is lived in our
culture. I will tell a few of those stories, as well as explore some of
the patterns, and consider the transformative potential they hold. At
the same time, I will suggest what the family stories of 9/11 tell us
about the persisting limits of law to transform embedded hierarchies.
I. LAW, CULTURE, AND FAMILY
My core proposition is that family is such a strong cultural con-
struct it can change the law, but law cannot change family. Our
cultural conception of family can be transformative or subversive of
the law, redefining family in relation to existing legal rules. But law is
an ineffective tool, by itself, to accomplish change or redefine family.
It may facilitate change or support change, but it cannot force change
in family culture.
For example, the fluidity of family forms contrasts with static le-
gal definitions that presume stability.17 Although our dominant legal
norm is that family is a heterosexual, marital, biological unit, our
social and cultural patterns expose a culture that is largely at odds
with that nuclear, marital family norm.1 8 Nearly a third of all families
with minor children under age eighteen are single-parent families.1 9
The rates of nonmarital cohabitation and divorce are significant.2
Marriage is no longer practiced by many as a lifelong partnership, nor
is it the only form of committed partnership, and the frequency of
16. See THE NEW YORK TIMES, PORTRAITS: THE COLLECTED "PORTRAITS OF GRIEF"
FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES (2002) [hereinafter PORTRAITS OF GRIEF].
17. Subversion of legal norms, however, may be linked to ongoing stigma, as well as either
the absence of structures of support or the undermining of disfavored families. Single-parent
families are stigmatized by the myth of unworthiness and blame, a focus on form to the
exclusion of function, which justifies lack of support and even discouragement instead of
addressing real needs. The disproportionate number of single-parent families in communities of
color, especially Black communities, where single-parent families are the predominant norm,
means a racial association and racial impact to legal policies that disfavor single-parent families.
DOWD, supra note 8, at 3-52 (1997).
18. Id. at 4-6.
19. JASON FIELDS & LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, American Families and
Living Arrangements 2000, June 2001, at 7, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-
537.pdf.
20. ALTERNATIVES TO MARRIAGE PROJECT, at http://www.unmarriesd.org/statistics.html.
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more than one marital partner or committed partner over a lifetime is
on the rise.21 Step or blended families are another related part of this
picture. From the perspective of children, they are a far more fre-
quent part of family life. Forty percent of children spend some time
with a stepparent before the age of fourteen; and at any one time,
roughly fifteen percent of all minor children live in a blended fam-
ily.12 Furthermore, children blend more commonly than do parents:
living with a half sibling is the most common blended family form,
from the perspective of children. 23 The establishment of family ties
irrespective of marriage or blood builds on the adoption model, but
originates and is lived out in entirely different ways.
There are other examples of culture subverting and transforming
law. The increase in independent adoptions, outside the traditional
adoption norm of family law, is another example of culture subverting
family.24 The rejection of secrecy and disempowerment of birthpar-
ents, and the reconceptualization of adoption as an open relationship
of shared knowledge and multiple parents combine to create an
emerging alternative model of adoption. The more open lives of gays
and lesbians, including civil unions, domestic partnerships, and name
changes, as well as the use of adoption law to legally stabilize non-
biological parenting relationships, is another example of culture
subverting the legal privileging of the heterosexual marital nuclear
family.25 These are examples of the culture of family subverting
family law norms.
21. Births Marriages Divorces & Deaths, 50 NVSR 1 (2002); JASON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, Living Arrangements of Children (2001).
22. DOWD, supra note 9, at 27, 64.
23. Id. at 27.
24. Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for
Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997 (1995); Daneille Saba Donner,
The Emerging Adoption Market: Child Welfare Agencies, Private Middlemen, and "Consumer"
Remedies, 35 J. FAM. L. 473 (1996-97); Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption and Aspiration: The
Uniform Adoption Act, the Deboer-Schmidt Case, and the American Quest for the Ideal Family,
2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 15 (1995); Lucy S. McGough & Annette Peltier-Falahahwazi,
Secrets and Lies: A Model Statute for Cooperative Adoption, 60 LA. L. REV. 13 (1999).
25. See, e.g., Symposium, "Family" and the Political Landscape for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgender People, 64 ALB. L. REV. 883 (2001); William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership
Laws in the United States: A Review and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961; William N. Eskridge
Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Juriprudence of Civil Union, 64 ALB. L. REV.
853 (2001); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating
Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341 (2002); Mark Strasser,
When Is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and Presumptions of Parenthood, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 299 (2001); Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy,
Interdependence and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265 (2000).
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The second part of my argument about law, culture, and family is
that family culture is so strong that law standing alone cannot achieve
change in family norms. In this respect, law can at best be a follower
or supporter, but cannot force change. Achieving social policy solely
by changing the rules is not possible; law is a limited instrumentality
without cultural support. Law may, possibly, facilitate cultural
change, but it cannot dictate such change in the realm of family.
One example of cultural resistance to legal change is the re-
sponse to changes in family law reconceptualizing parenthood from a
gender-specific, hierarchical, unequal model to a gender-neutral,
egalitarian model. This change is reflected in legal rules of joint
custody, gender neutrality, and presumed coequal partnership of
parents with shared work and family responsibilities.16 Changing
concepts of gender equality demand such reorientation of formerly
explicitly gendered norms of family law that incorporated male
breadwinner and female homemaker roles. Yet the pattern of
custody and care of children remains sharply skewed by gender. 27 It
can be argued that the barriers to equality norms are structural, but
the most significant barriers are cultural. Balancing work and family
obligations in a coequal way, without gendered expectations of who
most likely would be the sole or dominant caregiver or wageworker;
would be truly revolutionary. The perpetuation of inequality within
family law norms of equality and neutrality suggests that the limits of
new rules or legal standards are linked to the depth of commitment to
social change. Support for a balance of work and family remains
minimal in the United States, especially as compared to other ad-
vanced industrialized countries.28 Structural barriers and the lack of
26. DOWD, supra note 8, at 60-62; see Holden v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs. (N.J
Super. Ct. 1997) (unpublished case on file with author); see also Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-
1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21
(N.H. 1987). But see Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
27. Maternal custody (either sole or primary) remains at roughly 90%. DOWD, supra note
8, at 66-69. Another fascinating example of the resistance of culture to legal change is Berta
Hernandez-Truyol's analysis of Cuba. Her examination of persisting cultural roles of family,
despite socialist laws mandating equality, powerfully reveals the resistance of family culture to
law. Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Building Bridges V-Cubans Without Borders: Mujeres
Unidas por su Historia, 55 FLA. L. REV. 225 (2003).
28. See generally JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER (1999). For the policies in other
countries, see Nancy E. Dowd, Envisioning Work and Family: A Critical Perspective on
International Models, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311 (1989); Mikel A. Glavinovich, International
Suggestions for Improving Parental Leave Legislation in the United States, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 147 (1996); Suzan Lewis et al., Young Europeans' Orientations to Families and Work,
ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI., Mar. 1999, at 83; Arielle Horman Grill, Comment, The
Myth of Unpaid Family Leave: Can the United States Implement a Paid Leave Policy Based on
the Swedish Model?, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 373 (1996).
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affirmative supports, especially family income supports and childcare,
as well as time flexibility through leave, disability, or sick time poli-
cies, means a commitment to equality and balance is difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve.
Another related example of legal rules' inability to change family
culture is the legal norm of equal parenthood as applied to fathers.
Despite a gender-neutral legal norm, our cultural definition of
fatherhood remains firmly embedded in the breadwinner paradigm of
men as economic fathers.2 9 The cultural diminution of fathers as
caregivers and nurturers is nowhere more evident than in the treat-
ment of the father of Elian Gonzalez. 0 If the circumstances of Elian's
dilemma were reversed, e.g., if his father had brought him to the
United States and perished in the journey, while his mother remained
alive and in Cuba, it is hard to imagine that he would not have been
immediately reunited with his mother (unless she were transformed
into a "bad" mother). The vigorous fight to prevent his return was
only possible, in my view, because it was his father who remained
29. DOWD, supra note 9, at 132-56.
30. As described in Read Sawczyn, Note, The United States Immigration Policy Toward
Cuba Violates Established Maritime Policy, It Does Not Curtail Illegal Immigration, and Thus
Should Be Changed So That Cuban Immigrants Are Treated Similarly to Other Immigrants, 13
FLA. J. INT'L L. 343, 345 (2001):
Elian Gonzalez was plucked from the Florida Straits on November 25, 1999 after
clinging to an inner tube for two days. His mother, stepfather, and ten other people
accompanied him in a seventeen-foot aluminum boat. Dreadfully, both his mother and
stepfather died along with nine others. After being lashed onto an inner tube for two
days, Elian and two others were spotted by an American fishing boat and later brought
to the United States by the U.S. Coast Guard. Later, Elian was legally paroled into the
custody of his great uncle, Lazaro, under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. This
would not pose a problem except his biological father, Juan Miguel, who resides in
Cuba and works as a hotel doorman, demanded his son's return to Cuba, claiming that
the boy's mother, Elizabet, kidnapped him.
Attorney General Janet Reno determined that Elian's father should have custody
of the boy. Upset with this decision, Lazaro filed a federal lawsuit challenging Reno's
decision. This action forced Juan Miguel to travel to the United States to exert cus-
tody over his son. Upon the exhaustion of legal appeals granted to Lazaro and the
forcible removal of Elian from his care, Elian returned to Cuba with his father.
See also Deborah Sharp, Miami Shares Cuban Boy's Turmoil Exiles Voice Outrage Over INS
Ruling, USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 2000, at A3 (quoting Professor Berta Hernandez) ("Whether or
not we like the politics of Cuba is irrelevant. There's only one custodial parent left and there
should be no conflict. If the father's country had been Sweden instead of Cuba, the discussions
would have been dramatically different."). For a sampling of the legal literature on the case, see
Susan Frelich Appleton, From the Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins Era to the New
Millennium: 130 Years of Family Law, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 189 (2001); Margaret F. Brinig,
Troxel and the Limits of Community, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 733 (2001); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-
Truyol, Nativism, Terrorism, and Human Rights-The Global Wrongs of Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 521 (2000); Peter
Marguilies, Children, Parents, and Asylum, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (2001); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., American's Schizophrenic Immigration Policy: Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L.
REv. 755 (2000).
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alive. The commonplace legal rule that a surviving child would be
reunited with a surviving parent could be questioned because of
cultural assumptions and beliefs about fathers that could be used to
challenge and attempt to subvert legal rules.31
II. INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE AND PLURAL MARRIAGE
The power of cultural norms of family and the limits of law to
change family are vividly demonstrated by Bentley and Gordon.
Both focus on the nineteenth-century treatment of families deemed at
the margin: interracial couples and plural marriages. They tell us a
great deal about race and religion in the course of telling us about the
meaning of stigma and how the law helped construct this marginaliza-
tion. At the same time, the stories in these papers also tell us how
core cultural meanings were defined, in particular, the meaning of
marriage. Interracial marriages and plural marriages were deemed
beyond the pale of the sacred, emotional bond of marriage. What is
striking are the parallels in the definition of marriage defended
against these two perceived challenges. Marriage is conceptualized in
a way that underscores feeling and relational connection and is
characterized as so unique and meaningful as to be spiritual. Equally
fascinating is the evidence that despite subordination and stigma,
these relationships continued to exist, and at least in the case of
interracial marriage, cultural practice subverted legal rules, even as
legal rules complicated and even destroyed relationships. Ultimately,
legal rules changed with respect to miscegenation in the face of
changed cultural norms. Polygamy, on the other hand, remains a
practice both legally and culturally condemned.
A. Nancy Bentley, Legal Feeling: The Place of Intimacy in Interracial
Marriage Law
"Does law properly control sexual and family intimacy?" is the
question with which Nancy Bentley opens her paper.32 But she rightly
tells us that question gets it backwards because "in important respects
intimacy can be said to control law. ' 33 While controlling intimacy
may be the law's justification to intrude, intimacy also subverts law.
31. For another example of cultural attitudes toward fathers affecting the application of
legal analysis, see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
32. Bentley, supra note 14, at 773.
33. See id.
20031
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Bentley's example is miscegenation law. The insight she gives us
is not the familiar one of focusing on Loving v. Virginia.3 4 Rather, she
deconstructs one of Abraham Lincoln's arguments against slavery.
Lincoln argued, "[If] I do not want a negro woman for a slave, I do
[not] necessarily want her for a wife. '35 This statement encapsulates,
Bentley argues, an understanding of sex, intimacy, marriage, and
race. That understanding was reflected in the concrete regulation by
race of who could marry (but not of who could have sex). Yet this
understanding was subverted by culture and by cultural practices of
intimacy, which frequently crossed the color line.
The cultural understanding and meaning of the difference be-
tween sex and intimacy, and its relationship to race, are further
illuminated by Bentley's analysis of Charles Chesnutt's novel, The
Marrow of Tradition.36 As Bentley tells us, in the novel the main
character, Olivia Carteret, is horrified to discover that her father, a
white man, was married to a Black woman. This strong emotional
response exposes the operation of racial patriarchy that both privi-
leged and subordinated white women. It also exposes, as Bentley
argues, a cultural presumption of the known and significant difference
between sex and intimacy, especially intimacy expressed in its highest
form, in marriage. As Bentley says, "it is intimacy or marital feeling,
not sex, that prompts this censorship. 3 7
The law thus reflects the cultural construction of sex, intimacy,
marriage, and racial subordination. By separating sex and intimacy,
and privileging intimacy within marriage while allowing interracial
sex and nonmarital partnership or concubinage, racial subordination
could be reinforced and sexual access preserved, while also preserving
the power to confer less than full family privacy and individual
autonomy along racial lines.38 Gender privilege is also reinforced
since this construction was widely understood to preserve sexual and
intimate relationships of white men with Black women. At the same
time, it preserved the race privilege of white men over Black men, as
Black men were not understood to have the same sexual freedom
with respect to white women.39
34. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. Bentley, supra note 14, at 775 (quoting ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 397-98, 454-55, 636 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989)).
36. See id. at 778.
37. See id. at 784.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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As Bentley deftly shows us, Lincoln's remark and Chesnutt's
story not only demonstrate the law's support of cultural practices, but
also reveal the subversion of law by culture, because they reveal the
reality of interracial intimacy, not just interracial sex. Ironically, to
the extent cultural practice defies law, it also borrows from it. Bent-
ley talks about Habermas' notion of intimacy formalized through
marriage, where marriage acts as a "seal," a "public guarantor of a
private realm of free and autonomous human subjectivity. ' 40 When
those who are denied the seal claim it, they transgress and undermine
legal limits and boundaries. But they also are lured by the dominant
cultural norm. They claim the power of the core legal meaning of
marriage: a unique human bond of feeling and interrelation deserving
of public respect and honor.
One of the things that is striking about Bentley's examination of
miscegenation is the contrast to the more common view of miscegena-
tion as simply a long-ago immoral legal regime. Rarely do we look
more deeply into the sexual and intimate relations that it sought to
regulate. We might be inspired by this example to inquire into
modern family law, particularly the regulation and/or support of
nonmarital relationships. We also might be challenged to explore the
specific example of contemporary interracial couples. We remain a
remarkably segregated culture, and that is reflected in the racial
configuration of families.41 We might also explore the racial configu-
ration of family law. The culture that family law reflects and operates
to protect is predominantly white, middle-class culture.
B. Sarah B. Gordon, The War of Words: Revelation and Storytelling
in the Nineteenth-Century Campaign against Mormon Polygamy
Sally Gordon's examination of the nineteenth-century campaign
against polygamy is an equally interesting and challenging paper. It
40. See id. at 780.
41. On continuing hostility to interracial relationships, see, for example, Maurice E.R.
Munroe, Unamerican Tail: Of Segregation and Multicultural Education, 64 ALB. L. REV. 241,
263-68 & nn. 170-71 (2000) (In 1994, almost 50% of white Americans disapproved of interracial
marriage; when repeated in 1997, and with 18-25 year olds included, this figure declined to 33%.
As late as 1999, when South Carolinians removed the ban on interracial marriage from their
state constitution, a poll showed almost 40% nevertheless supported such a ban.); see also
Stephanie M. Wildman, Book Review, Interracial Intimacy and the Potential for Social Change,
17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 153 (2002) (reviewing RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL
INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE). On "everyday racism," see also JOE
R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS
EXPERIENCE (1994).
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presents the problem of minority cultures functioning within majority
culture. It also presents the issue of the definitions of freedom and
individual autonomy. Finally, because polygamy is linked to religious
belief, it raises constitutional questions of whether the First Amend-
ment should trump everything else, and do so always.
What Gordon explores, like Bentley, are stories that tell us how
the culture viewed polygamy and the legal story told to justify its
proscription. Her goal is not to critique whether Reynolds v. United
States42 is well reasoned, but rather to see how nineteenth-century
culture described, understood, and argued against the practice of
polygamy. Her analysis ultimately leads to a description of "true"
marriage that is strikingly similar to the valued marriage described by
Bentley.
Gordon sets out the origin of plural marriage in the history and
doctrine of the Mormon church, emphasizing that it was linked to a
patriarchal tradition that was an elitist tradition: the propagation of
the genetic line of religious leaders, from the example of Abraham,
translated to apply only to church leaders.41 Polygamy was linked to
what Gordon describes as "the role of revelation and the promise of
exaltation in all aspects of the faith."" What you did for the faith in
this life insured your eternal life; those things that called for the most
sacrifice, because they would be the most challenged by the dominant
culture, would insure this spiritual glory. As Gordon puts it, this
"transformed daily life into the most profound of spiritual exer-
cises."
4
As Gordon explains, the Mormons' position was a serious chal-
lenge. Their commitment to patriarchy, authority, and polygamy was
in the name of revelation, religious doctrine, and therefore the free
exercise of religion. If monogamy was simply a Christian tradition,
then it could not invalidate polygamy; indeed, to do so would violate
both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. 6
Instead, opponents of polygamy used stories to construct a secular,
neutral definition of marriage. Marriage's monogamous form was
made essential to foundational secular and political principles silently
42. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
43. Compare Gordon, supra note 15, at 742.
44. See id. at 743.
45. See id. This connection between the spiritual and sexual was not limited to Mormons,
Gordon points out; "spiritual wifery" was known in other sects, and other sexual practices,
including celibacy, were characteristic of other religions. Id. at 746.
46. See id. at 747-48; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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enshrined in the Constitution. 7 Anti-polygamy novels thus claimed
polygamy was not only a threat to the family, but also to the Repub-
lic. "[S]piritual union in marriage was the true source of the faith and
virtue essential to republican government. '48 Because of marriage's
importance and vulnerability, it needed to be protected.
Gordon also points out that protection of women factored into
the argument against polygamy. Women needed protection from
men's animal desires and from exploitation, since women were
expected, by broad cultural agreement, to obey their husbands. 49
Anti-polygamy arguments drew the parallel to slavery, thus using the
power of anti-slavery rhetoric, but without crossing the line to chal-
lenge marriage institutions themselves and their subordination of
women. "Though they entreated federal politicians to protect
otherwise helpless women in Utah, novelists were careful not to
directly challenge legislators' views of themselves as husbands. '50
The understanding of marriage that Gordon finds in the anti-
polygamy stories is strikingly parallel to the conception of marriage
that Bentley describes in the miscegenation stories.1 Marriage is
spiritual and sacred, a unique bond. "True" marriage is deemed
fundamental and antecedent to the Constitution. The United States
Supreme Court's opinions mirror this view of marriage as transcen-
dent and embedded in the Constitution, with monogamy simply
presumed.5 2
47. See Gordon, supra note 15, at 747-48
48. See id. at 753.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 761.
51. Compare id. (spiritual union in marriage was the true source of the faith and virtue
essential to republican government), with Bentley, supra note 14, at 777 (marriage in a
particular opposition to sex bespoke a species of feeling or intimacy that had become a powerful
source of social legitimacy).
52. Comparing the two arguments reveals how the characterization of marriage shifts to
defend culture. In opposition to polygamy, marriage is secularized and constitutionalized.
Within the constitutional cases that recognize marriage as a fundamental right, even though not
explicit in the text of the Constitution, marriage is characterized in natural law terms, as
something universal and transcendent, linking its value to its spiritual and religious nature. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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III. DEFINING "FAMILY" AFTER 9/11: TRANSFORMATIONS AND
LIMITS
Like these two nineteenth-century examples, amidst 9/11 are sto-
ries of marginalized families. Unlike the fiction used to condemn
marginalized marriages analyzed by Bentley and Gordon, however,
the true stories of families touched by 9/11 have the potential to be
transformative rather than subordinating. In these stories lies the
potential to honor intimate relational ties of love and feeling over
formal or structural definitions of family. At the same time, the
aftermath of 9/11 reveals the constraints on such transformation, as
the pattern of loss was deeply gendered, raced, and classed. 3
One of the remarkable consequences of 9/11 is what it revealed
about families. The lives of those who perished exposed the complex
fabric of family relationships that are the reality of American society.
Rather than statistics on single-parent families, cohabitating couples,
blended families, and same-sex couples, 9/11 yielded powerful indi-
vidual vignettes of the lives that were cut short on that day, and the
implications of those losses for the relational webs of individuals.5 4
What we see in the 9/11 victims and their families are patterns of
change, patterns of multiple family forms, and relationships of feeling
sometimes in alignment with legal relationships, but often not.
One of the questions that emerged early was who would be enti-
tled to compensation for their loss, focusing particularly on cohabitat-
ing couples, common law marriages, same-sex couples, and
stepfamilies. Families and family members outside the preferred
nuclear heterosexual marital norm with biological or formally
adopted children faced, in addition to grief and loss, challenges to a
recognition of their loss and to their need for assistance. Their
dependency or interdependency was obscured by their lack of legal
status.
53. See Andy Humm, Second Class Survivors: Gay and Lesbian Partners of 9-11 Victims
Struggle to Receive Their Benefits, THE VILLAGE VOICE (New York), Nov. 20, 2001, at 55;
Nightline (ABC, television broadcast, Sep. 10, 2002), LEXIS, News Library, Current News File
(This Nightline newscast included the voices and music of the night workers in WTC, who are
dominantly Latinos/as, low income and male.).
54. The New York Times for months ran an extraordinary section of obituaries, covering
the lives of those who died in a quite unique way, very different from the ordinary obituary with
its almost ritual sparse set of facts. See PORTRAITS OF GRIEF, supra note 16.
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Our response to 9/11, it seems to me, has been to embrace all
who have lost and thereby to embrace the most fluid, flexible, rela-
tional view of family. It is a definition of family founded in love and
emotion, acts and history, rather than status or formality. At least on
this occasion, we have forgotten our objections to nontraditional
families and embraced a definition of family based on emotional
connection. Perhaps we have witnessed a transformation.5" The
movement to embrace nontraditional families in this instance may
support greater tolerance and even change legal rules that deny the
cultural realities of the characteristics of family culture as it is lived
out in the patterns of these families: pluralistic, multifaceted, creative,
and fluid.
A. Stories from 9/11
The 9/11 stories include those of husbands and wives, of daugh-
ters and sons. In Middletown, a suburban New Jersey town on the
train line from New York, fifty residents who left for work that
morning never came home.16 One who lost her husband, Pat Wotton,
visited Ground Zero, rushed to the railing, and shouted "Rod, come
back! How could you leave me!"5" Eight days after the attacks, she
delivered a baby boy who spent the next three weeks in intensive care
with serious respiratory problems. Kevin Laverty was waiting for his
wife Anna to retire so they could move to a condo in Florida. He too
felt angry: "Angry at her. One hundred percent! She called me, and
I told her to get the hell out. But she was so kind-hearted to peo-
ple. '58 Nikki Stern, whose husband died, never tires of talking about
him, and the story of how they met and nurtured a romance during a
wonderful summer in Paris: "I mean, it was just a love story."5 9 For
some, the loss was too difficult to bear. Ninety-one days after the
attacks, the wife of one victim, Pat Flounders, committed suicide.6°
55. It is also mirrored in the spiritual diversity demonstrated since 9/11 as well as the
recognition and reaction to cultural ignorance of Islam, and concern that fear not translate into
racial and religious hatred. See NPR News Special: Native American Elders Performing
Ceremony to Release Spirits in Battery Park (NPR radio broadcast, Sep. 11, 2002), LEXIS, News
Library, Current News File (Native American ceremony to release the spirits of the dead; the
neighborhood ceremony in Battery Park included a Buddhist, imam, rabbi, priest, and minister).
56. Gail Sheehy, Six Months Later; U.S. Fragments, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 2002, at 15A.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Specials and Breaking News 9/11 (ABC television broadcast, Sep. 11, 2002).
60. Tom Templeton & Tom Lumley, 9/11: One Year On, THE OBSERVER (London), Aug.
18, 2002, at 7.
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There are also stories of family surprises. After the death of
Alexis Leduc, Isa Rivera, his partner of twenty-three years who had
three children with him, filed for benefits as a survivor. A second
woman, however, also had a marriage certificate showing that she was
Leduc's wife. Soon thereafter, two children of Leduc's from a prior
relationship also filed claims.61 Under the federal fund, each victim
may have only one family representative, who decides how money
will be divided among family members.62
Far more common than multiple marriages or other intimate
partners were couples who had lived as partners for years and were
able to marry, but never did so. Marmily Cabrera was the partner for
eleven years of Pedro Checo, vice president of investment operations
for Fiduciary Trust, and had two children with him. They considered
themselves married in a common law marriage, but New York State
does not recognize common law marriage. Marmily will not be able
to recover under the final rules of the federal fund, nor under state
law.63
Then there are the stories about children lost to parents and par-
ents lost to children. One of the children who lost a parent is twelve-
year-old Hilary Strauch, who was the subject of an extended article
one year after 9/11. Hilary saw the continuous television coverage of
planes flying into the World Trade Center ("WTC"), her father's
workplace, knowing he was in the building. George Strauch worked
on the ninety-ninth floor of the south tower. Hilary became a "celeb-
rity" in her hometown of Avon-by-the-Sea, New Jersey, and felt
pressure to take care of the feelings of awkwardness that those
around her, including her teachers, were feeling. She continues to
search for the right "face" to wear through all of this, the face that
will allow her to blend back into the crowd. 64
61. Susan Edelman, Twin Wives: 9/11 Victim's Double Life Exposed In Claims Court, N.Y.
POST, June 2, 2002, at 1.
62. William Sherman, Kin File For 9/11 Funds, Insurance Deductions Questioned, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 25, 2001, at 8.
63. Jennifer Barrett, New Rules Mean More Money for Families, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 2002.
64. Jodie Morse, The 9/11 Kid, TIME, Sep. 9, 2002, at 48. Regarding her unwanted fame,
Hilary stated:
I've heard about people having their 15 minutes. I think I've had a little more than 10,
and I'm done with it. But I don't think it will stop. Maybe someday when I get older,
get a job and move away from Avon, maybe at that point I won't be that different from
everyone else. I think it feels a little like being schizophrenic or being a character in a
play.
She found some normalcy, and a place where she could be herself at a camp for children of the
victims. According to the article, Hilary and the other children at the camp were most worried
about having to relive their own suffering during 9/11 anniversaries. Hilary did not like the fact
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One of the most poignant statistics of 9/11 is that sixty-three ba-
bies were born to sixty-one women after that day.65 But there were
also the children never born: one victim who had just told her hus-
band hours before that she was pregnant died that morning.66 One
British report estimates the number of orphans from the attacks at
1,300.67 Some of the children killed were adult children. Not all
parents are in agreement on how to proceed, as some are long di-
vorced. One such couple is acting totally independently regarding the
death of their son, each retaining separate counsel.68
There were thirty-nine sets of twins affected, where one of the
twins lost their life on 9/11. One set of twin brothers, both firefight-
ers, rushed to the scene of the WTC. One survived, the other did
not. Both had children, and because of the biological link between
the brothers, the cousins are virtually identical cousins. When the
surviving brother was asked, "Does it bother her that you look so
much like her dad?" with regard to his niece, he replied, "I'm sure at
some times [it bothers her] more, [but] I think its more good than bad
because I think the one thing she'll get [is] to see someone who looks
almost just like her dad as he would have looked growing older."69
Intertwined within the 9/11 stories also are step relationships that
attest to the emotion and power of the relationships within blended
families. At the New York City memorial service one year after 9/11,
the reading of the names was striking in its exposure of who was lost.
Also part of the ceremony was Marion Kean's rereading of her
eulogy for her stepfather, Franco Lalama: "He was the best father I
could ever ask for."70 A stepsister of another 9/11 victim traveled to
Afghanistan in her sister's memory, to link with Afghan families and
protest a military response to 9/11, in honor of her stepsister's pacifist
beliefs.71
Immigrant families were among those hardest hit by 9/11.
Among the survivors are the next of kin of undocumented workers,
that the media knew the details of the tragedy before she did, and yet had no connection to her
father. Id.
65. Specials and Breaking News, supra note 59.
66. Kelly Lucas, Lawyers Mobilize to Counsel Victims, IND. LAW., Sep. 11, 2002, at 1.
67. Templeton & Lumley, supra note 60.
68. Julie Kay, Sad Dilemma, BROWARD DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, Sep. 11, 2002, at Al.
69. Specials and Breaking News, supra note 59.
70. Franco Lalama was an engineer for the Port Authority who worked on the sixty-fourth
floor of the WTC. Id.
71. Frank Griffiths, Terror War Denounced; 9-11 Victim's Stepsister Calls for Peaceful
Response, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, Mass), Apr. 15, 2002.
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who cannot risk making a claim.72 There are also family members of
visa holders who have lost their link to a legal immigrant.73
The community that has suffered disproportionately from inter-
secting problems of denial of legal status and recognition are family
members of gay and lesbian victims. Mark Bingham was one of the
passengers on Flight 93, which crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. 74
A rugby player and ex-campaign worker for Senator John McCain,
Bingham apparently was part of the group that attacked the hijackers
and brought the plane down, avoiding a second attack on Washing-
ton. Bingham is survived by his partner of many years, who resides in
California. Another California survivor, Keith Bradkowski 5 was Jeff
Coleman's registered domestic partner of eleven years. David
O'Leary lost his partner of seventeen years in the WTC.76 David
Charlebois, the copilot of the plane that crashed into the Pentagon, is
survived by his partner of fourteen years. 77 George Cuellar lost the
"love of his life," his partner of twenty years, Luke Dudek, who was a
food and beverage controller for the restaurant at the top of the
WTC, Window on the World. They lived in New Jersey, where
George manages a flower shop that they owned together.78
Elba Cedeno waited for nearly three weeks after the towers col-
lapsed and finally reluctantly went to Pier 94 to register as a survi-
vor.79 Her domestic partner, Catherine Smith, perished in the WTC.
72. There has been a flood of citizenship applications, up 72% from previous years, some
from long-time green card holders, for fear of the repercussions if they did not become citizens.
See Leslie Casmir, Stampede's On to Become a U.S. Citizen, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 14, 2002,
at Surburban-1. Among the families hardest hit by the tighter immigration restrictions are
undocumented workers, and disproportionately those are Hispanic workers. Ironically, a
coalition of national organizations is pushing for legalization of millions of undocumented
workers, those without criminal records who work and pay taxes. They argue that these
workers are a primary support of agricultural, poultry, and services sectors, and use their
income to support their families seeking a better life in the United States. See Rebeca Logan,
US-Immigration (Hispanics) -Coalition Seeks Legalized Status for Undocumented Workers in
U.S., EFE NEWS SERVICE, May 16, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Current News File.
73. Id.
74. Press Release, Congressional Press Releases, Feinstein Calls on Attorney General to
Ensure that Deserving Gay and Lesbian Partners of 9/11 Victims Receive Fair Compensation
From the September 11 Compensation Fund (Dec. 19, 2001), LEXIS, News Library, Current
News File.
75. Bush Administration Close to Changes in 9/11 Victims Fund, BULLETIN'S
FRONTRUNNER, Mar. 5, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Current News File; see also, All Things
Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 11, 2001), LEXIS, News Library, Current News File.
76. Press Release, supra note 74.
77. See id.
78. Humm, supra note 53.
79. Jessica DuLong, Pair Recognition; Sept. 11 Survivors of Same Sex Partners Face Extra
Challenges, NEWSDAY, Jan. 22, 2002, at B3.
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Cedeno is an unregistered domestic partner. She described Smith as
her "soul mate." Cedeno may ultimately receive some compensation
under the liberalization of city and state funds, but will be unlikely to
recover under the federal fund.8° The lesbian partner of a civilian
Pentagon employee similarly was denied benefits from the compara-
ble state agency in Virginia.
There are twenty-four known surviving domestic partners of
those who perished on 9/11.81 Many were long-term partnerships.
Whether they are assisted at all, by private or state funds, depends
upon the variable state frameworks for unmarried partners. Because
the federal fund will follow state law, the variability of state law will
yield uneven results. California has domestic partner legislation, as
does New Jersey and New York City. There is no such legislation in
New York State, Connecticut, or Virginia. 82
The American Red Cross quickly adopted a policy of explicitly
offering disaster relief to domestic partners, as the result of immedi-
ate lobbying efforts by gay and lesbian activist groups, led by Empire
State Pride Agenda.83 Governor George Pataki amended his 9/11
emergency executive order to redefine a dependent person to include
those showing "mutual interdependence '." 84 Just a few years before,
the same state board had successfully fought not to treat domestic
partners the same as spouses. Pataki was also lobbied to make
domestic partners of uniformed workers who were killed in the rescue
effort eligible for pensions and other benefits. The City of New York
also offered benefits to domestic partners. Most private funds set up
by businesses hit by the WTC collapse cover domestic partners,
although they do not advertise this on their web sites.85
Despite this liberalization of many sources of relief, sources of
financial relief that were denied to most domestic partners included
federal social security, state pensions, and worker's compensation, all
of which would have required new legislation to include domestic
partners.86 Despite efforts to liberalize the language (including
support from senators from New York, Massachusetts Congressman
Barney Frank, and Senator Feinstein of California), the final regula-
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Barrett, supra note 63.
83. Humm, supra note 53.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. DuLong, supra note 79.
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tions for the Victim Compensation Fund issued in March, 2002 limit
relief in ways that deny compensation to gay or straight unmarried
partners, fianc6es, and common law spouses.87 On the other hand, the
receptive and sympathetic public response to the victims of 9/11 has
contributed to a new challenge to New Jersey's marriage law, with
explicit reference to the partners lost and children affected by 9/11.
In addition, the long-stalled New York State gay rights bill is moving
through the legislature. 88
B. Patterns of Hierarchy: Race, Gender, and Class
Although the 9/11 stories reveal patterns of pluralistic family
forms, if we "ask the other question" of the presence of other hierar-
chies in the patterns, the 9/11 stories expose some familiar hierar-
chies. First, race patterns are evident in the victims. The victims of
the attacks were predominantly white, middle-class males. The rush
to provide financial compensation for the victims is dramatically
different from the response to the earlier terrorist attack on the U.S.
embassy in Kenya, also linked to Al-Qaeda. On August 7, 1998, 5,000
people were injured and 218 were killed, including twelve Americans.
The vast majority of the dead and injured were Kenyans. Although
aid has been provided to Kenya, no compensation has been provided
to the victims. Proposed legislation would compensate the families of
the twelve diplomats killed at about $1 million each. The families of
the 167 Kenyans who died would get nothing under the legislation. 89
Second, the pattern of 9/11 victims is strongly differentiated by
class, and that class-based pattern is being reinforced by a compensa-
tion system linked to earnings, rather than loss in absolute terms.
Lives are not equal in this tragedy, but rather are valued by earning
power in addition to the scope of dependents connected to each
victim. Compensation, however, does not require dependency.
87. Barrett, supra note 63; see also Bush Administration, supra note 75.
88. The Lambda Legal Defense Fund is challenging the New Jersey marriage law: "The
case (Lewis et al. v. Harris et al.) is being launched at a critical time. The valiant struggle for
gays and lesbians who lost their partners on September 11 has helped to create a new reservoir
of respect and understanding for our loving relationships. Now is the time to translate that new
support into legal equality." Available at http://www.lamdalegal.org/cgi/iowa/cases/record?-
record=179. On the progress of the New York gay rights bill, see James C. McKinley, Jr., New
York Bill on Gay Rights Is Set for Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at Al.
89. Marketplace (Minnesota Public Radio Broadcast radio broadcast, Sep. 13, 2002),
LEXIS, News Library, Current News File; see also Bob Braun, Embassy Bomb Survivors Feel
9/11 Kinship, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Sep. 5, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Current News
File.
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Value, instead, is attached to earnings. 9° Class-based compensatory
systems also inevitably have a disproportionate racial impact. Finally,
the pattern of the victims is strongly gendered, because the time of
day and location of the attacks meant the victims, including victims
among the rescuers, were predominantly men, reflecting the gender
distribution of work as well as the gender distribution of work and
family responsibilities. 9
What the stories of 9/11 also expose, then, is what we do not no-
tice or choose to ignore. Most notably, we ignore the perpetuation of
those hierarchies in the compensation rules that replicate these
hierarchies. Lives lost are devalued by race and class and valued by
gender, and inequities are reinforced while the norms of inequality
are quietly enforced. Thus, within potential transformation is the
reinforcement of other hierarchies.
CONCLUSION
One of the positive legacies and dramatic lessons of 9/11 may be
that among the many unities that have emerged is a unity of cultural
acceptance of family pluralism. For some, the patterns were known
and familiar; for others, abstract statements and statistics were
suddenly made powerfully real. Sympathy perhaps opened the door
to understanding the lived realities of families as consciously plural.
With that understanding may come another incremental shift towards
accepting, even valuing, actual relational ties. Responsiveness to
those treated as being at the margin, beyond the scope of aid, would
suggest that. It suggests that law will yield to changed cultural norms
and realities. At the same time, the acceptance of hierarchies among
90. The complications even of determining "earnings" reflect class differences. One group
of employees who sought help after 9/11 were a group from the Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees International Union, Local 100. These downtown waiters were unable
to file tax returns because their earnings records were destroyed in the restaurants crushed by
debris. Big firm tax lawyers, who had volunteered their services, had to figure out how to
replace the lost records. According to another story, some survivors asked how to report off the
books income for purposes of compensation without triggering tax problems. Federal Victims
Compensation Fund at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensationl.
91. The demographics of the World Trade Center victims, including those on planes, based
on over 90% of estimated total deaths are as follows: 75.9% White, 9.4% Hispanic, 7.9% Black,
6.3% Asian, .4% other; approximately 78% male and 22% female. Statistics available at
http://www.septemberllvictims.com/ septemberllvictims/wtcstatistics.htm. The FDNY was
94% white male as of November, 2000; 11,344 total firefighters, 321 Black, 341 Hispanic, 20
Asian, 9 Native American, and 36 female. Elissa Gootman, Graduates of New Program to Join
Fire Department Soon in Diversity Effort, Nov. 16, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com//-
learning/students/pop/ 0011 17snapfriday.html.
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the families demonstrates how transformation can yet remain pro-
foundly limiting, even reinforcing conservative, subordinating norms
to which the culture clings. Law has not succeeded in changing those
hierarchies; culture continues to embrace them.
